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Abstract
The purpose of Secure Multi-Party Computation is to enable protocol participants to compute a public
function of their private inputs while keeping their inputs secret, without resorting to any trusted third
party. However, opening the public output of such computations inevitably reveals some information
about the private inputs. We propose a measure generalising both Re´nyi entropy and g-entropy so as to
quantify this information leakage. In order to control and restrain such information flows, we introduce
the notion of function substitution which replaces the computation of a function that reveals sensitive
information with that of an approximate function. We exhibit theoretical bounds for the privacy gains that
this approach provides and experimentally show that this enhances the confidentiality of the inputs while
controlling the distortion of computed output values. Finally, we investigate the inherent compromise
between accuracy of computation and privacy of inputs and we demonstrate how to realise such optimal
trade-offs.
Keywords: Information Flow, Re´nyi Entropy, g-entropy, Computational Privacy, Non-linear Optimisation.
1 Introduction
We study the setting of functions f that map n integral inputs x1, . . . , xn into one integral output. Each
input xi is controlled by some agent i and its value is considered private to agent i. The computation of
function f is multi-party secure if its evaluation protects the privacy of the inputs, so that agent j cannot
learn more from this computation about the other values xi than what agent j is able to infer from knowledge
of her own input xj and the publicly observable output f(x1, . . . , xn).
Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) is a domain of cryptography that can implement such a black-
box functionality: it enables protocol participants to compute a public function of their private inputs, such
that no trusted third party is required, and that the confidentiality of the inputs is protected [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6].
Recent advances in SMC have given birth to a variety of efficient protocols that achieve computational and
information-theoretic security against passive and active adversaries [7, 8, 9, 10].
SMC therefore gives strong security guarantees, but it does allow inferences about other agents’ input
values based on the publicly observable output and one’s own private input. This is referred to as the
acceptable information flow in the SMC literature, in which this is therefore largely ignored. In fact, this so
called acceptable information flow is oblivious to the manner in which a protocol realises the aims of SMC.
Consequently, such information flows would also occur in the setting of outsourced computation. In this
case, a trusted third party or a central authority (e.g. a national health agency) holds some records from
different parties (e.g. some medical insurance companies), computes a function of those records and informs
the parties of the result of the computation, such that no information leaks about the parties’ inputs apart
from the public output.
But we believe that such information flow is not always acceptable, e.g., in the medical domain with
its strict privacy regulations. Moreover, we think that it is important to understand and quantify such
information flow in order to
• better understand potential risks of using SMC in a specific application, say, a health-care consortium
of insurers and hospitals
• devise methods that can mitigate or prevent such information flow.
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The latter aim contains within it an inherent friction. The information flow whose existence only depends on
knowledge of some private inputs and the public output can neither be mitigated against nor prevented by
an SMC protocol that computed that function f . Rather, for such measures to be effective, we will need to
modify the actual behaviour of function f : we will instead use another function f ′ for which the acceptable
information flow is absent, less pronounced or optimal according to some risk measure. The aforementioned
friction consists of the need to shield against such undesired information flow for function f by replacing the
latter with function f ′. This substitution naturally introduces some inaccuracy in the value of the computed
output, which will need to be controlled.
The notions of security developed for SMC are not directly helpful in understanding this friction and its
inherent trade-off. SMC security neither reflects the amount of information that leaks from a computation
once the public output is revealed, nor does it account for the ability of an attacker to influence such
leakage before entering a protocol [11, 12, 13, 14]. We therefore develop, in this paper, bespoke methods for
understanding this better. Specifically:
1. We generalise a model of such information flow, developed in [15], to an entire family of conditional
entropies. This subsumes the Shannon and min entropies as well as the notion of g-leakage in Computer
Security.
2. We devise a method of distorting the output of a function f with so called virtual inputs so that the
distorted function f ′ may be computed through standard means, such as SMC protocols.
3. We express a trade-off between privacy preservation of agents’ inputs and output accuracy as a non-
linear optimisation problem, whose solution computes optimal virtual inputs.
4. We demonstrate that these optimisations can be solved for a large class of our conditional entropies,
including the aforementioned ones.
5. We also offer theoretical insights that relate and characterise the relationship between the accuracy of
the distorted function and the level of privacy that such distortions offer.
This work is motivated by, and applicable to, Secure Multi-Party Computations. Our methods do not
rely on the particular protocols used for SMC, but only on the abstract setting of a black-box function f to
which parties i submit a private input xi and all then learn the public output of f . We will therefore present
the core of our technical development in this abstract setting, to stress that these results are orthogonal to
the choice of an SMC protocol.
Naturally, the application context of an SMC may constrain or inform our approach. In a voting protocol,
e.g., a mere deviation from the original function f would hardly be tolerable. But our approach may be used
to enhance the privacy in less restrictive scenarios such as in the computation of statistical measures or
financial audits.
Outline of Paper. We discuss related work in Section 2. Needed technical background from information
theory is covered in Section 3. Our development of a generalised conditional entropy is the subject of Section 4.
The development of our model for information flow for black-box functions and the attacker’s entropy for
that are described in Section 5. The method by which one can randomise black-box functions through virtual
inputs is developed in Section 6 and its theory is presented in Section 7. Our approach to optimisation of
the trade-off between privacy and accuracy of black-box functions, and its contributions, are developed in
Section 8. A discussion of our work is contained in Section 9 and Section 10 concludes the paper.
2 Related Works
Information flow in programs Information flow analysis in imperative programs has been explored
with many different approaches. One of the fundamental concepts is that of security classes, introduced
by Denning [16], which enables one to classify the variables of a program with respect to their level of
confidentiality in order to form a lattice of information. Based on this classification, type systems [17] and
semantic approaches [18] have been implemented in order to define the security of instructions involving
such variables. The most basic model considers only two security classes L and H separating the variables
with a low and high level of confidentiality respectively [16]. The security of a program is then expressed
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with the notion of non-interference between both classes [17, 19, 20]. However, as programs in practice
may contain some interference, other quantitative approaches [21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26] have been proposed
in order to measure the information flow that can arise between variables from different security classes.
The computation of such quantitative information flows also includes the use of probabilistic instructions
[27, 18, 19] that can randomise the algorithms and make programs non-deterministic and thus in some cases
protect the confidentiality of information processed by variables in H.
Information flow in SMC The security of SMC protocols ensures by definition that the participants can
compute the public output of a public function of their private inputs without learning anything about the
other parties’ input, apart from what is inferable from the so called acceptable information flow we already
discussed.
In [15], we introduced a model of deceitful adversaries which enabled us to reason about the acceptable
leakage, and to quantify, based on Shannon entropy, the information that such attackers can deduce from
public outputs and their own private inputs. We also extended our model to a theoretic game that allows
an attacker to evaluate the influence that he can have depending on the input he provides to the SMC
protocol. In this present work, we build on this model to develop an approach that can mitigate or prevent
this information leakage. We are able to do this for a large class of conditional entropies, which subsumes
both the notions of Re´nyi entropy and g-entropy. We then introduce the notion of an approximate function,
a corresponding non-linear optimisation problem, and we show how solving such optimisation problems can
address certain privacy concerns raised in [15].
Differential privacy The principle of randomising the output of a computation in order to protect the
privacy of the data on which some calculations are performed is related to the concept of Differential Privacy
(DP) [28, 29]. DP formalises privacy concerns and introduces techniques that provide users of a database
with the assurance that their personal details will not have a significant impact on the output of the queries
performed on the database. More precisely, it proposes mechanisms which ensure that the outcome of the
queries performed on two databases differing in at most one element will be statistically indistinguishable.
Thus, DP means to reassure users of a database that their confidential data may be used in statistical
measures without harming their individual privacy. Moreover, minimising the distortion of the outcome of
the queries while ensuring privacy is an important trade-off that governs DP.
Our approach aims at introducing concepts and mechanisms that can reassure participants of an SMC
that they can engage in a computation whose public output will not affect their own privacy. Our privacy-
enhancing techniques will also consider the accuracy of the randomised computation and they are akin to
the Laplace mechanism in DP which blurs queries’ outputs with an additive noise. However, our aims and
the methods we develop and use are significantly different. In DP, an attacker would take advantage of
the information gained by repeating the same queries on two neighbouring databases, which would not be
realistic in many applications of SMC such as in auctions or in e-voting. Instead, we focus on the amount of
information on the private inputs that would flow from a single SMC. DP also does not model knowledge or
belief of attackers whereas we model belief about protocol inputs of parties. Moreover, in our attack model
a set of agents may collude in order to learn private information. Adapting DP techniques to SMC would
therefore not necessarily be always possible, appropriate, nor even yield intended privacy guarantees.
3 Background and Notations
We recall different notions of entropy used for quantifying information.
Notations. Let D be a discrete set. We write P(D) for the power set of D, and |D| for the cardinality of
set D. Let Ω(D) be the set of all probability distributions whose support is contained in D. Throughout,
we present distributions as Python dictionaries with domain values as keys and associated probabilities as
values. For example, {4: 1/2, 8: 1/2} represents the uniform distribution over {4, 8}. For any integers a and b,
we will write Ja, bK for the set of consecutive integers ranging from a to b, namely {a, a+1, · · · , b}. The set of
positive integers will be denoted by N>0 while R≥0 and R>0 will denote the set of non-negative and positive
real numbers respectively. Let n be in N>0. A linear distribution over J1, nK will refer to the triangular
distribution with mode n, i.e. to the distribution {k : 2kn(n+1) | 1 ≤ k ≤ n} where 2n(n+1) is a normalising
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factor. Given random variable X and value x, the event “X = x” will be abbreviated by “x” when there is
no ambiguity, and its probability will be denoted by p(x). Similarly, we will abbreviate
∑
x∈D by
∑
x when
the domain D is obvious from context.
We denote by 〈xi〉1≤i≤n the n-dimensional vector in Rn whose coordinates are x1, · · · , xn; we abbreviate
this by 〈xi〉i when there is no ambiguity. For all vector v in Rn and all p in R≥0, the usual p-norm of v is
denoted by ‖v‖p. Let log denote the logarithm in base 2 and let µ be the function defined for all non-negative
real x as:
µ(x) =
{
−x · log(x) if x > 0
0 if x = 0
(1)
Shannon and min-entropy. Recall that for two random variables X and Y taking values in X and Y,
respectively, the Shannon entropy H1(X) [30] of X and the Shannon entropy H1(X | Y ) of X given Y are
given as:
H1(X) = −
∑
x
p(x) log p(x) H1(X | Y ) =
∑
y
p(y) H1(X | y) (2)
where H1(X | y) = −
∑
x p(x | y) log p(x | y). On the other hand, the Bayes vulnerability V∞(X) [26, 31, 32]
expresses the probability of guessing a secret in one try. Similarly, the conditional Bayes vulnerability [33]
V∞(X | Y ) of X given Y reflects the average probability of guessing the secret X in one try. They are
defined as:
V∞(X) = max
x
p(x) V∞(X | Y ) =
∑
y
p(y) V∞(X | y) (3)
where V∞(X | y) = maxx p(x | y). The min-entropy of X and conditional min-entropy of X given Y are
defined as:
H∞(X) = − log V∞(X) H∞(X | Y ) = − log V∞(X | Y )
Re´nyi Entropy. A more general notion of entropy, called Re´nyi entropy [34], generalises both notions of
Shannon entropy and min-entropy. For sake of notational convenience, let us first define the α-vulnerability
of X, for all positive real α 6= 1, as: Vα(X) = ‖〈p(x)〉x‖α Using this notion, we may express the Re´nyi
entropy Hα(X) of X as:
Hα(X) =
α
1− α log Vα(X)
It is well-known and easily shown that the Re´nyi entropy Hα(X) converges towards the min-entropy
H∞(X) as α tends towards infinity. Moreover, an application of L’Hoˆpital’s rule ensures that the Re´nyi
entropy Hα(X) converges towards the Shannon entropy H1(X) as α tends towards 1.
However, although different notions of conditional Re´nyi entropy have been proposed, none of them
has yet been commonly accepted as the conditional Re´nyi entropy [35]. Yet, one candidate seems to be
particularly suitable for our needs: Arimoto’s [36] notion of conditional Re´nyi entropy not only satisfies
the natural properties of chain rule (Hα(X | Y ) ≥ Hα(XY ) − log |Y|, where Hα(XY ) denotes the joint
entropy of X and Y ) and monotonicity (Hα(X | Y ) ≤ Hα(X)). But it is also compatible with both the
Shannon entropy and the min-entropy in that we have the convergences Hα(X | Y ) −−−→
α→1
H1(X | Y ) and
Hα(X | Y ) −−−−→
α→∞ H∞(X | Y ). Therefore, we will introduce and work with the notion of conditional Re´nyi
entropy due to Arimoto [36]. For sake of notational consistency, let us define the α-vulnerability of X given
Y as: Vα(X | Y ) =
∑
y p(y) Vα(X | y) where Vα(X | y) = ‖〈p(x | y)〉x‖α. For α 6= 1, we may now define the
conditional Re´nyi entropy of X given Y as:
Hα(X | Y ) =
α
1− α log Vα(X | Y )
g-entropy. The g-entropy [37] measures the gain that someone might get from guessing a secret — in our
case, the private inputs of other parties. Since this is a relevant way of measuring risk of privacy violations,
we wish that our approach and developed methods also support use of this notion of entropy.
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Let X be the domain of X, where random variable X models a secret. Let W be the set of possible
guesses for the value of X. A function g of type W×X → [0, 1] is then called a gain function. This function
assigns to each guess w in W and possible value x of the secret in X a reward g(w, x) that an attacker would
gain by guessing w when the secret value actually is x. Set W may be designed so that its elements refer to
properties of secrets, values that are “close” to the secret or other means of expressing aspects of the secret.
For such a gain function g, the g-vulnerability of X, Vg(X), is the expected reward that an attacker would
gain by selecting his best guess. It, and the conditional g-vulnerability Vg(X | Y ) of X given Y are defined
as:
Vg(X) = max
w
∑
x
p(x)g(w, x) Vg(X | Y ) =
∑
y
Vg(X | y) (4)
where Vg(X | y) = maxw
∑
x p(x | y)g(w, x). The g-entropy and conditional g-entropy are then defined as
follows:
Hg(X) = − log Vg(X) Hg(X | Y ) = − log Vg(X | Y )
The g-entropy generalises the min-entropy: for W = X and gain function id : X × X → [0, 1] — where
id(w, x) = 0 if w is not equal to x, and id(x, x) = 1 for all x in X , then Hid(X) equals H∞(X) and Hid(X | Y )
equals H∞(X | Y ).
4 Generalised Conditional Entropy
To get a very general definition of information leakage in Secure Multi-Party Computations (SMC), we define
a more general notion of entropy that subsumes both Re´nyi entropy and g-entropy. For random variables
X and Y with finite domain X and Y, and a finite set W of possible guesses for X, we adapt the existing
notions, such as the Bayesian vulnerability, to the presence of a gain function g and its set of guesses W. We
indicate that dependency by writing Vα,g and so forth, subsequently. We define properties of gain functions
that are pertinent to our technical development.
Definition 1. Let g : W ×X → [0, 1] be a gain function.
1. The gain function g is positive iff ∀x ∈ X : ∑w g(w, x) > 0
2. Let β be in R>0. The gain function g is β-positive iff ∀x ∈ X :
∑
w g(w, x) ≥ β
3. The gain function g is unitary iff ∀x ∈ X : ∑w g(w, x) = 1
We will only consider positive gain functions: a gain function that is not positive is the constant 0 function,
and can only produce 0 vulnerabilities — as mentioned in [37]; β-positive gain functions will be useful in later
sections. Note that, since X is finite, all positive gain function g have some β > 0 such that g is β-positive.
Let g : W ×X → [0, 1] be a gain function and 0 < α 6= 1. The (α, g)-vulnerability Vα,g(X) of X and the
conditional (α, g)-vulnerability Vα,g(X | Y ) of X given Y are defined as:
Vα,g(X) :=
∥∥∥∥∥
〈∑
x
p(x)g(w, x)
〉
w
∥∥∥∥∥
α
Vα,g(X | Y ) :=
∑
y
p(y) Vα,g(X | y) (5)
where Vα,g(X | y) :=
∥∥〈∑x p(x | y)g(w, x)〉w∥∥α. We now define the (α, g)-entropy of X and the conditional
(α, g)-entropy of X as:
Hα,g(X) :=
α
1− α log Vα,g(X) Hα,g(X | Y ) :=
α
1− α log Vα,g(X | Y ) (6)
Again, we can easily verify that the (α, g)-entropies Hα,g(X) and Hα,g(X | Y ) both converge towards
their respective g-entropies as α tends towards infinity. We may thus define:
H∞,g(X) := Hg(X) H∞,g(X | Y ) := Hg(X | Y )
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g
α α = 1 α =∞ α ∈ ]0,∞]
g = id Shannon entropy min-entropy Re´nyi entropy
g ∈ [0, 1]W×X only for unitary g g-leakage
Figure 1: Summary of the different notions of entropy that our generalised measure of information flow Hα,g
subsumes.
We now focus on the case when α tends towards 1 and we define, where µ is as in (1):
H1,g(X) :=
∑
w
µ
(∑
x
p(x)g(w, x)
)
H1,g(X | Y ) :=
∑
w
µ
(∑
x
p(x | y)g(w, x)
)
For unitary gain functions g, it is easy to see that the (α, g)-entropies Hα,g(X) and Hα,g(X | Y ) converge
towards H1,g(X) and H1,g(X | Y ), respectively, when α tends towards 1. The reason for this is that, when
g is unitary, the (α, g)-vulnerabilities Vα,g(X) and Vα,g(X | Y ) converge towards 0 as α tends towards 1.
And then the claimed results follow from the application of L’Hoˆpital’s rule, in a similar fashion as done for
Re´nyi entropies. Let us formalise this:
Lemma 1. 1. Let g : W × X → [0, 1] be a gain function. Then Hα,g(X) and Hα,g(X | Y ) converge for
α→∞:
lim
α→∞Hα,g(X) = H∞,g(X) limα→∞Hα,g(X | Y ) = H∞,g(X | Y )
2. Moreover, if g is unitary, then Hα,g(X) and Hα,g(X | Y ) converge when α tends towards 1, and we
then have:
lim
α→1
Hα,g(X) = H1,g(X) lim
α→1
Hα,g(X | Y ) = H1,g(X | Y )
When the gain function g is id with W = X as above, we obtain that for all positive reals α, the
(α, id)-entropies agree with the Re´nyi entropies:
Hα,id(X) = Hα(X) Hα,id(X | Y ) = Hα(X | Y )
This result is immediate for all values of α different from 1. When α is equal to 1, this follows from the
fact that id is a unitary gain function and that we can apply the previous result ensuring that when α
tends towards 1, the (α, id)-entropies Hα,id(X) and Hα,id(X | Y ), respectively, converge towards H1,id(X) (the
Shannon entropy) and H1,id(X | Y ) (the conditional Shannon entropy), respectively. We summarise those
results and our discussion in Figure 1.
In conclusion, our new notion of entropy subsumes both the g-entropy and the whole family of Re´nyi
entropies, including the Shannon entropy and the min-entropy. Therefore, all results that we develop in this
paper will also be valid for all the different entropies mentioned earlier.
5 Information Flow for Secure Multi-Party Computation
5.1 Model for Information Flow
Let us recall the technical setting and the assumptions introduced in [15] for studying and quantifying the
information flow produced by public outputs in SMC, as this constitutes a basis for the remaining technical
developments in this paper. Throughout this paper, we consider a set of n > 1 parties P = {P1, · · · , Pn}
holding the respective inputs x1, · · · , xn, each of them belonging to Z. Let f : Zn → Z be a function. Let o
denote the output of the function applied with the parties’ inputs, i.e. o = f(x1, · · · , xn). Both o and f are
public and so known to all parties in P. In order to study the aforementioned acceptable information leakage
of this situation, we introduce the following model. Let A and T be two non-empty subsets of P and S be
a possibly empty subset of P such that (A,T,S) forms a partition of P. Our attack models assumes that all
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parties in A are willing to collaborate between each other in order to maximise information leakage on inputs
of the parties in T. The sets A, T and S will thus respectively be referred to as the sets of attackers, targets
and spectators, respectively. We now define the attackers’ input xA = 〈xi〉i∈A, the targets’ input xT = 〈xi〉i∈T
and the spectators’ input xS = 〈xi〉i∈S. By abuse of notation (or a reordering of arguments for f), we will
also refer to the output specification of f as o = f(xA,xT,xS).
Let a = |A|, t = |T| and s = |S| denote the cardinality of the respective sets. Let DA be an element of
P(Z)a and let us assume that the input vector of the parties in A is ranged in DA. Similarly, let DT in P(Z)t
and DS in P(Z)s be the domain of the input vectors of the parties in T and S respectively. In other words,
we assume that:
xA ∈ DA, xT ∈ DT, xS ∈ DS
However, as those inputs are private, their exact value is not known to the other parties. In order to quantify
the information leaks that output o produces, we model the parties’ inputs as random variables XA, XT and
XS respectively, following the respective probability distributions:
piA ∈ Ω(DA), piT ∈ Ω(DT), piS ∈ Ω(DS)
where Ω(X) is the set of discrete probability distributions over a finite set X. These probability distributions
will model the beliefs that each set of parties has on the other parties’ inputs. More precisely, the parties in
A and T believe that random variable XS is governed by piS, the parties in A and S believe that XT follows
piT, whereas the parties in T and S believe that XA follows piA. We articulate the assumptions we make about
these distributions:
Assumption 1. We assume that the parties’ beliefs piA, piT and piS are public and are part of the common
knowledge amongst all parties in P. Moreover, our model assumes that the three groups of parties will not
collaborate between each other and that their inputs are thus independent.
The independence of XA, XT and XS will play an important role in the proofs of the Theorems in Section
7. The assumption that their probability distributions are public and part of the common knowledge ensures
that all the parties will be able to access the same data produced by our measure of information flow in
Section 5.2 and Section 6, and will be able to reach a consensus regarding how to best protect the targeted
inputs’ privacy, as discussed in Section 8. These probability distributions can express a variety of beliefs from
uniform to point mass distributions.
Lastly, let DO in P(Z) be the output domain, defined as DO = {f(xA,xT,xS) | xA ∈ DA,xT ∈ DT,xS ∈
DS}. As a function of random variables, the output o = f(xA,xT,xS) will therefore be modelled by the
random variable:
Of = f(XA, XT, XS) (7)
ranged in DO. We sometimes write O when f is clear from context. In order to quantify the information
that the attackers would learn about XT when inputting a particular input xA, we introduced in [15] the
attackers’ weighted average entropy awaeAT defined for all xA in DA as the conditional Shannon entropy of
XT given O and xA, i.e.:
awaeAT(xA) =
∑
o
p(o | xA)
∑
xT
µ(p(xT | o,xA)) (8)
where µ was defined in (1).
A deceitful attacker, i.e. an attacker who is willing to lie on his honest and intended input in order to learn
more information on the private inputs of his targets, will now be able to take advantage of this indicator
in (8) in order to shape his input so as to maximise his information gain. Since the notion of awaeAT in (8) is
an instance of the conditional Shannon entropy, we need to widen the approach and analyses of [15] to make
them compatible with more general notions of entropy. We develop this next.
5.2 General Attackers’ Entropy
Function awaeAT for measuring information leakage is dependent on some implicit parameters, namely the
SMC function f , the partition (A,T,S) of P and the distributions piT and piS of the targets and spectators’
inputs. Our technical development needs to make those parameters explicit, and it needs to work for the
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generalised entropy notion presented in Section 4. Therefore, we now define a higher-order function Awae
which fulfils those requirements. Subsequently, we will work with a set of allowable guessesW for the targeted
input xT.
Definition 2. Let α be in R>0 ∪ {∞} and g : W × DT → [0, 1] be a gain function. We introduce the
higher-order function Awaeα,g of type:
Awaeα,g : (Zn → Z)× P(P)3 × Ω(Z)2 → (DA → R+)
that takes as arguments an SMC function f of type Zn → Z, three disjoint sets of participants (A,T,S) that
form a partition of P, the probability distribution (piT, piS) of the respective targets’ and spectators’ inputs,
and returns a function Awaeα,g(f, (A,T,S), (piT, piS)) of type DA → R≥0, denoted as awaefα,g and defined for
all xA in DA as the conditional (α, g)-entropy of XT given Of as in (7) and xA:
awaefα,g(xA) = Hα,g(XT | Of ,xA)
For subsequent theorems and proofs, we note that for 0 < α 6= 1 we have:
awaefα,g(xA) =
α
1− α · log Vα,g(XT | Of ,xA) (9)
where the (α, g)-vulnerability Vα,g(XT | Of ,xA) can be written as:
Vα,g(XT | O,xA) =
∑
o
p(o | xA) ·
∥∥∥∥∥∥
〈∑
xT
p(xT | o,xA) · g(w,xT)
〉
w
∥∥∥∥∥∥
α
(10)
=
∑
o
∥∥∥∥∥∥
〈∑
xT
p(xT) · p(o | xT,xA) · g(w,xT)
〉
w
∥∥∥∥∥∥
α
(11)
This is so since α-norm is homogeneous, even for α < 1, and since xA and xT are independent random
variables.
This new function awaefα,g provides us with a generic way of measuring information flow. Indeed, it
subsumes some notions of entropy that are widely used in cryptography. For example, when g equals id, this
function corresponds to the conditional Re´nyi entropy. When α equals ∞, it corresponds to the conditional
g-entropy. We also observe that when α equals 1 and g equals id, our new function awaef1,id is identical to
the function awaeAT introduced in [15].
We now illustrate how our general measure of information flow in Secure Multi-Party Computations
enables us to quantify the information that attackers can gain on their targets’ inputs. In doing so, we also
raise interesting concerns that will further motivate our present work. Let us consider an example.
Example 1. Let us consider 3 parties X, Y and Z holding the respective inputs x, y and z, and where
A = {X} is attacking T = {Y } under spectator S = {Z}. Let DA = DT = DS = J1, 30K and let us assume that
XT and XS are uniformly distributed over this domain. Let f : Z3 → Z be defined by f(x, y, z) = x(2y+z)+2z.
In this example, we will study the behaviour of the conditional min-entropy of the targeted inputs. In
other words, we will instantiate α with ∞ and g with id in order to study the function awaef∞,id which we
plot in Figure 2. This plot clearly shows that some values of xA are more advantageous for attacker X in
that they produce lower conditional entropies for his targeted input Y . For instance, inputting x = 2 would
produce a high entropy and would not reveal much information about y. In contrast, input x = 15 would
produce entropy 0, which means that X would learn the exact value of y from the output. Indeed, as X knows
his own input, he knows that in this case, the output equals o = f(15, y, z) = 30y + 17z. We can check that
for all z in DS the function fz : y 7→ f(15, y, z) is bijective from DT to fz(DT) as both sets have size 30. This
thus ensures that attacker X can deduce the exact value of y when learning the output value.
We just saw that the choice of the attackers’ input xA can have a dramatic influence on the entropy of
the targeted input xT. In particular, the attackers can harm the privacy of their targets by choosing some
judicious inputs xA. In order to mitigate against this privacy concern, we next introduce and study the
notion of approximate SMC computation.
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Figure 2: Illustration of awaef∞,id in the computation of function f(x, y, z) = x(2y + z) + 2z with piT and piS
uniform over J1, 30K, when X attacks Y under spectator Z.
6 Function Randomisation Via Virtual Inputs
We now consider the case where revealing the exact value of the output of f , namely o = f(xA,xT,xS),
would be likely to jeopardise the privacy of the targeted input xT. Thus, we would like to be able to replace
the computation of f by the computation of an approximate function f ′, whose output should not only be a
decent indicator of o, but should also enhance the privacy of T’s input. This presents an inherent trade-off
between the accuracy of the output and the privacy of the inputs. We will understand this trade-off in detail
in Section 8.
In order to randomise the observed output, the function f ′ will take an additional argument ϕ, that may
consist in a number of integral inputs, and that will act as a source of randomness that can distort the output
to protect privacy of targeted inputs. Let us next formalise this notion of approximate function.
Definition 3. Let n be in N>0, v be in N and f : Zn → Z be an n-ary function.
1. Function f ′ : Zn×Zv → Z is an approximation of f or that f ′ approximates f iff there exists a function
h : Z× Zv → Z such that:
∀x ∈ Zn,∀ϕ ∈ Zv : f ′(x, ϕ) = h(f(x), ϕ) (12)
2. An approximation f ′ of f is a close approximation of f — or f ′ closely approximates f — iff for all ϕ in
Zv, the function hϕ : Z→ Z is injective, where hϕ is defined for all ϕ in Zv as ∀o ∈ Z : hϕ(o) = h(o, ϕ).
3. We define f+ : Zn+1 → Z, the additive approximation of f , for all x in Zn and ϕ in Z as f+(x, ϕ) =
f(x) + ϕ.
We illustrate the notion of approximate function f ′ for a function f in Figure 3. Function f ′ has all inputs
of f and additional virtual inputs ϕ; and its black box contains “internal wirings” so that ϕ and the output o
of f are fed into function h within that black box to produce approximate output o′. A close approximation
f ′ of f requires all the functions hϕ to be injective, which makes sense for SMC as it enforces a correlation
between the output of f and that of its approximation f ′. Indeed, knowledge of o′ and ϕ determine that of o,
which prevents o′ to be independent from o. We also note that the additive approximation f+ of a function
f closely approximates the latter.
The use of a substitute function f ′ aims to contain and limit the information that would flow from the
computation of f by randomising the output of f with an additional variable ϕ. Therefore, we need to
understand and quantify the information flow that the computation of such an approximate function f ′
produces, and we need to study and represent the behaviour of the additional variable ϕ that f ′ uses to
randomise the output of f . To ensure the security of such approximations, variable ϕ is not held by any
physical party, it is a virtual input, a concept we formalise next.
Definition 4. Let n and v be in N>0. A v-dimensional virtual input ϕ is a vector in Zv, independent from
the other inputs, and not held by any party in P. As such, its value ϕ is kept secret and appears to all the
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Figure 3: Comparison of the black-box model for SMC of function f (left) with that of its approximation
f ′ (right), as introduced in Definition 3. The virtual inputs ϕ and the output o of f are fed into function h
within the black box to produce approximate output o′.
parties in P as a random variable Φ on domain DΦ following a probability distribution piΦ, referred to as the
virtual distribution. A set of virtual parties V is deemed to be the (virtual) owner of ϕ.
In other words, the probability distribution piΦ can be regarded as the prior belief that all the parties in P
have on input ϕ. Note that all those parties in P will have the same public prior belief on ϕ, in accordance
with Assumption 1, and that P and V are mutually disjoint.
The set of parties P′ for function f ′ is P′ = P ∪ V. We now study the privacy that targeted parties gain
when the computation of a function f is substituted for that of an approximation f ′, randomised by a virtual
input ϕ.
Definition 5. Let n > 1 and v in N>0. Let f : Zn → Z be a function and let f ′ : Zn×Zv → Z approximate f .
Let a virtual input ϕ be in Zv and let piΦ be its probability distribution. Finally, let α be in R∪{∞} and g be
a gain function of type W×DT → [0, 1]. Using the joint probability distribution defined by (piS ·piΦ)(xS, ϕ) :=
piS(xS) · piΦ(ϕ) for all xS in DS and ϕ in DΦ, function awaef
′
,piΦ
α,g : DA → R≥0 is given as:
awaef
′
,piΦ
α,g := Awaeα,g(f ′, (A,T,S ∪ V), (piT, piS · piΦ)) (13)
This function awaef
′
,piΦ
α,g measures the privacy of the targets, given a certain approximate function and
virtual input distribution. It will be particularly useful, for studying how privacy changes for different virtual
input distributions. The assumption that for f ′ and f , the sets A and T are unchanged, does not compromise
the security of our approach: an attacker for function f ′ could not really learn anything useful about the
input of parties in V, since these inputs are randomly drawn according to piΦ. Let us illustrate the benefits
offered by function substitution.
Example 2. Let us re-consider the scenario of Example 5, but now with the additive approximation f+ of
f . We will study the behaviour of the conditional min-entropy of the targeted inputs when we approximate f
with f+. In other words, we will study the function awaef
+
,piΦi
∞,id for the following distributions piΦi:
piΦ1 = {−2: 1/4, 0: 1/4, 2: 1/4, 4: 1/4}
piΦ2 = {−1: 1/4, 0: 1/4, 1: 1/4, 2: 1/4}
piΦ3 = {−3: 1/8,−2: 1/8,−1: 1/8, 0: 1/4, 1: 1/8, 2: 1/8, 3: 1/8}
As seen in Figure 4, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, function awaef
+
,piΦi
∞,id is above awae
f
∞,id. This suggests that ran-
domising a computation effectively enhances the privacy of the targeted inputs.
The latter example indicates that function randomisation indeed contributes to improving the privacy
of the targets. In the next section, we want to formally investigate the privacy gains offered by function
randomisation. In particular, we would like to understand why substituting the computation of a function f
by that of an approximation f ′ can only enhance the privacy of the targets, and we will further characterise
this privacy gain for close approximations.
7 Theory of Virtual Input Randomisation
We first summarise the mathematical setting we study in the remainder of this paper:
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Figure 4: Benefits of substituting the computation of f by that of its approximation f+ in the computation
of f(x, y, z) = x(2y + z) + 2z with piT and piS uniform over J1, 30K. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, the function awaef+,piΦi∞,id
is above awaef∞,id.
Assumption 2. In the remainder of this paper, including lemmas and theorems, f ′ is an approximation of
f , where ϕ is a virtual input with domain DΦ. Moreover, g : W×DT → [0, 1] is a positive gain function, and
β is a positive real.
The following theorem states that the computation of any approximate function f ′ will not produce a
lower privacy for the targeted inputs than that produced by the computation of f .
Theorem 1. Let α be a positive real different from 1. Then, we have:
∀piΦ ∈ Ω(DΦ),∀xA ∈ DA : awaef
′
,piΦ
α,g (xA) ≥ awaefα,g(xA) (14)
Proof. Let D := DA ×DT ×DS and X := (XA, XT, XS). By definition, since f ′ approximates f , there is a
function h such that f ′(x, ϕ) = h(f(x), ϕ) for all x in D and all ϕ in DΦ. The random variable representing
the output of f , namely O = f(X) has domain DO. Similarly, let DO′ be the domain of the output of f
′,
namely O′ = f ′(X,Φ) = h(f(X),Φ) = h(O,Φ). Let piΦ be in Ω(DΦ) and xA be in DA. We recall that we
have:
awaef
′
,piΦ
α,g (xA) =
α
1− α · log Vα,g(XT | O
′,xA)
where:
Vα,g(XT | O′,xA) =
∑
o
′
∥∥∥∥∥∥
〈∑
xT
p(xT) · p(o′ | xT,xA) · g(w,xT)
〉
w
∥∥∥∥∥∥
α
(15)
Applying Bayes Theorem twice, and as Φ is independent from XA, XT and O, we obtain that:
p(o′ | xT,xA) =
∑
ϕ
p(ϕ) · p(o′ | xA,xT, ϕ) (16)
=
∑
ϕ
p(ϕ) ·
∑
o∈h−1ϕ (o′)
p(o | xA,xT) · p(o′ | xA,xT, ϕ, o)
since p(o′ | xA,xT, ϕ, o) 6= 0 only when o is in h−1ϕ (o′). Moreover, p(o′ | xA,xT, ϕ, o) = 1 for o in h−1ϕ (o′).
Case α > 1. We can apply the triangular inequality twice from Equation (15) in order to obtain:
Vα,g(XT | O′,xA) ≤
∑
o
′
∑
ϕ
p(ϕ)
∑
o∈h−1ϕ (o′)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
〈∑
xT
p(xT) · p(o | xA,xT) · g(w,xT)
〉
w
∥∥∥∥∥∥
α
(17)
11
For any given ϕ in DΦ, the collection of sets (h−1ϕ (o′))o′∈D
O
′ constitutes a partition of DO. So there exists
a unique o′ in DO′ such that o is in h
−1
ϕ (o′). We can thus simplify the double summation over o′ and o as a
single sum over o:
Vα,g(XT | O′,xA) ≤
∑
ϕ
p(ϕ) ·
∑
o
∥∥∥∥∥∥
〈∑
xT
p(xT) · p(o | xA,xT) · g(w,xT)
〉
w
∥∥∥∥∥∥
α
Since α is greater than 1, the expression α1−α is negative and we get:
awaef
′
,piΦ
α,g (xA) ≥ awaefα,g(xA) (18)
Case α < 1. We can show that for all n in N>0, for all x and y in (R≥0)n, we have ‖x+ y‖α ≥ ‖x‖α + ‖y‖α.
This follows from Minkowski inequality in the case where α is lower than 1, since x 7→ xα is then concave on
R≥0. This reversed triangular inequality reverses the inequality obtained in (17) and as α1−α is now positive,
we find the same result as in (18).
The proof of the previous theorem is based on the analysis of the formal expressions of awaef
′
,piΦ
α,g (xA) and
awaefα,g(xA) when 0 < α 6= 1. However, we can extend this result to α = 1 and α =∞, by appealing to that
result for positive α 6= 1 and the continuity of inequalities under limits:
Corollary 1. 1. We have: ∀piΦ ∈ Ω(DΦ),∀xA ∈ DA : awaef
′
,piΦ∞,g (xA) ≥ awaef∞,g(xA).
2. Moreover, if g is unitary, then we have: ∀piΦ ∈ Ω(DΦ),∀xA ∈ DA : awaef
′
,piΦ
1,g (xA) ≥ awaef1,g(xA).
Proof. By virtue of Lemma 1, we know that letting α tend towards ∞ in Theorem 1 yields the result stated
in item 1) above. Similarly, if g is unitary, Lemma 1 ensures that Theorem 1 implies the result stated in item
2) as α→ 1.
Concretely, the theorem states that learning a function of the output of f cannot leak more information on
the inputs of f than the output of f may leak already. On the other hand, we are able to estimate an upper
bound for the privacy of the inputs of the targeted parties, once a computation has been randomised. The
next theorem states that, when replacing the computation of a function f by that of a close approximation
f ′, the entropy gain provided by a virtual input cannot exceed the entropy of the distribution for the virtual
inputs.
Theorem 2. Let f ′ be a close approximation of f and 0 < α 6= 1. Then, we have:
∀piΦ ∈ Ω(DΦ),∀xA ∈ DA : awaef
′
,piΦ
α,g (xA) ≤ awaefα,g(xA) + Hα(piΦ) (19)
where Hα(piΦ) refers to the Re´nyi entropy of order α of the distribution piΦ.
Proof. By definition, since f ′ closely approximates f , there exists some function h such that f ′(x, ϕ) =
h(f(x), ϕ) for all x in D and ϕ in DΦ. Let piΦ be in Ω(DΦ) and xA be in DA. For sake of readability, we set
V ′ = Vα,g(XT | O′,xA) and use V ′ in the arguments below. From Equation (16), we recall that:
V′ =
∑
o
′
∑
w
∑
xT
p(xT) ·
∑
ϕ
p(ϕ) · p(o′ | xA,xT, ϕ) · g(w,xT)
α
1
α
Case α > 1. We know that x 7→ xα is convex on R≥0 and equals 0 at 0. We also know that x 7→ x
1
α is
increasing on R≥0 and thus:
V′ ≥
∑
o
′
∑
w
∑
ϕ
∑
xT
p(xT) · p(ϕ) · p(o′ | xA,xT, ϕ) · g(w,xT)
α
1
α
(20)
≥
∑
o
′
∑
w
∑
ϕ
p(ϕ)α ·
∑
xT
p(xT) · p(o′ | xA,xT, ϕ) · g(w,xT)
α
1
α
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Let us denote
∑
ϕ p(ϕ)
α by σ. For any ϕ, we have p(ϕ)α = σ · p(ϕ)
α
σ . But also
∑
ϕ
p(ϕ)α
σ equals 1. We
also know that x 7→ x 1α is concave. Therefore, Jensen’s inequality yields:
V′ ≥ σ 1α
∑
ϕ
p(ϕ)α
σ
∑
o
′
∑
w
∑
xT
p(xT) · p(o′ | xA,xT, ϕ) · g(w,xT)
α
1
α
(21)
Moreover, we have p(o′ | xA,xT, ϕ) = p(O ∈ h−1ϕ (o′) | xA,xT) since O and Φ are independent. Further-
more, for all ϕ in DΦ, we know that hϕ is injective. Thus, from (21) we get that:
V′ ≥ σ 1α
∑
ϕ
p(ϕ)α
σ
∑
o
∑
w
∑
xT
p(xT) · p(o | xA,xT) · g(w,xT)
α
1
α
≥ σ 1α
∑
o
∥∥∥∥∥∥
〈∑
xT
p(xT) · p(o | xA,xT) · g(w,xT)
〉
w
∥∥∥∥∥∥
α
and as α1−α is negative, the claim follows:
awaef
′
,piΦ
α,g (xA) ≤ awaefα,g(xA) + Hα(piΦ) (22)
Case α < 1. This us dual: x 7→ xα is concave, the inequality of (20) is reversed, x 7→ x 1α is convex, and
the inequality in (21) is reversed, too. However, term α1−α is now positive. Thus, a dual argument shows
that (22) holds.
We can also extend the result of Theorem 2 to the limiting cases, i.e. to when α equals 1 or ∞.
Corollary 2. 1. We have: ∀piΦ ∈ Ω(DΦ),∀xA ∈ DA : awaef
′
,piΦ∞,g (xA) ≤ awaef∞,g(xA) + H∞(piΦ).
2. Moreover, if g is unitary, then we have: ∀piΦ ∈ Ω(DΦ),∀xA ∈ DA : awaef
′
,piΦ
1,g (xA) ≤ awaef1,g(xA) +
H1(piΦ).
Proof. Lemma 1 ensures the convergence of awaef
′
,piΦ
α,g (xA) and of awaefα,g(xA) towards awaef
′
,piΦ∞,g (xA) and of
awaef∞,g(xA) respectively when α tends to ∞. Moreover, it is known that the Re´nyi entropy Hα(piΦ) of order
α converges to the min-entropy H∞(piΦ) as α tends towards ∞. Thus, the result stated in item 1) follows
from Theorem 2 by letting α tend towards∞. A similar argument concludes the proof for α tending towards
1, in the case that g is unitary.
Although one could have proved Corollaries 1 and 2 with bespoke and somewhat different arguments, it
is pleasing to see that our generalised conditional entropy makes such arguments uniform and reasonably
simple. Given a close approximation f ′ of a function f , Theorems 1 and 2 and Corollaries 1 and 2 give us
a lower bound and an upper bound for the entropy gain that a given virtual distribution provides. We can
formalise this through a gain function Γα,g, which indicates how much entropy we gain by adding a virtual
input to the SMC computation — as a function of the chosen probability distribution of this virtual input:
Definition 6. Let f ′ be a close approximation of a function f . Let α be in R>0∪{∞}. Let us further assume
that either α is different from 1 or g is unitary. Then, we define the function Γα,g for all piΦ in Ω(DΦ) and
xA in DA by:
Γα,g(piΦ,xA) := awaef
′
,piΦ
α,g (xA)− awaefα,g(xA) (23)
Then, under the assumptions of Theorem 2, we can summarise our above results as follows:
Corollary 3. Let f ′ be a close approximation of f . Let α be in R>0 ∪ {∞}. Let us further assume that
either α is different from 1 or g is unitary. Then, we have:
∀piΦ ∈ Ω(DΦ),∀xA ∈ Ω(DA) : 0 ≤ Γα,g(piΦ,xA) ≤ Hα(piΦ) (24)
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Figure 5: Illustration of the bounds of awaef
+
,piΦi
∞,id in the computation of f(x, y, z) = x(2y + z) + 2z with piT
and piS uniform over J1, 30K. For all i in J1, 3K, the function awaef+,piΦi∞,id is contained between awaef∞,id and
awaef∞,id + H∞(piΦi).
Proof. This result is a direct consequence of Theorems 1 and 2 and Corollaries 1 and 2.
Let us now illustrate Theorems 1 and 2 by means of a worked example.
Example 3. Let us re-consider the scenario in Example 5 with the additive approximation f+ of f ; in
particular, f ′ is a close approximation of f . We study the behaviour of the conditional min-entropy of the
targeted inputs when we approximate f with f+. In other words, we study the function awaef
+
,piΦ
∞,id for different
distributions piΦ. Since f+ is a close approximation of f , Theorems 1 and 2 apply, and thus for all piΦ in
Ω(Z) and for all xA in DA, we have:
awaef∞,id(xA) ≤ awaef
+
,piΦ
∞,id (xA) ≤ awaef∞,id(xA) + H∞(piΦ) (25)
In order to illustrate this property, we choose different distributions for ϕ that all have equal min-entropy:
piΦ1 = {−2: 1/4, 0: 1/4, 2: 1/4, 4: 1/4}
piΦ2 = {−1: 1/4, 0: 1/4, 1: 1/4, 2: 1/4}
piΦ3 = {−3: 1/8,−2: 1/8,−1: 1/8, 0: 1/4, 1: 1/8, 2: 1/8, 3: 1/8}
All those distributions have a min-entropy of − log(1/4) = 2. In Figure 5, we plot the functions awaef∞,id,
awaef∞,id +2, and awae
f
+
,piΦi
∞,id for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. We can verify that Equation (25) indeed holds: for all
1 ≤ i ≤ 3, the function awaef
+
,piΦi
∞,id is contained between the functions awae
f
∞,id and awae
f
∞,id + H∞(piΦi).
Finally, note that although the three virtual distributions piΦi have equal min-entropy, they produce dif-
ferent values for awaef
+
,piΦi
∞,id . From the plots we can clearly see, e.g., that piΦ1 produces higher entropy values
than piΦ2 in general. This observation motivates us to seek optimal virtual distributions, which we focus on
in the next section.
8 Optimal Trade-Off Between Accuracy and Privacy
So far, we developed a means of replacing a function f by an approximating function f ′ which resorts to
additional, virtual inputs governed by some distribution. We showed that such approximations enable us
to protect the privacy of the targeted inputs. These benefits are hampered by the fact that the approach
introduces a distortion on the output for function f when computing with f ′ instead. The participants of the
SMC computation from set P are either eager to learn the actual output of function f or they would tolerate
only a certain difference between the outputs of f and f ′, and these demands would typically be informed
by the use-context of the SMC computation.
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Therefore, we need to have methods by which we can control the support and the distribution of the
virtual input, in order to measure and control both the distortion that f ′ and piΦ introduce, and the privacy
gain that it offers over using f for SMC instead. We therefore develop now the formalism needed for studying
the inherent trade-off between the accuracy of the output and the privacy of supplied inputs. We also recall
that Assumption 1 ensures that any of the parties can perform the methods we introduce next and compute
optimal virtual distributions. When replacing the computation of a function f by an approximation f ′, the
output accuracy is directly influenced by the choice of f ′. A function f ′ that is the constant 0 function, e.g.,
would not reveal anything about the inputs, but be very inaccurate.
Assumption 3. In the remaining paper, we will focus on additive approximations f+ of f .
This is a natural assumption to make, it simplifies our problem, as shown in (27), and enables us to characterise
optimal virtual distributions. We will also propose some practical methods from optimisation for discovering
virtual distributions that realise this trade-off in an optimal manner.
8.1 Maximal and Optimal Distortion
We want to contain the distortion introduced by computing f+ instead of f . Formally, for a given virtual
input ϕ with distribution piΦ, we will tolerate a certain distortion threshold ∆ in N>0 that serves as upper
bound for the maximal absolute difference ξ(f, f+) between the output of f and f+, i.e. ξ(f, f+) ≤ ∆ where:
ξ(f, f+) := max
ϕ∈supp(piΦ)
x∈D
|f(x)− f+(x, ϕ)| (26)
and where supp(piΦ) := {ϕ ∈ DΦ | piΦ(ϕ) > 0} denotes the support of piΦ. For the additive approximation
f+ of f , we can see that ξ(f, f+) equals max{|ϕ| | ϕ ∈ supp(piΦ)}. Thus, we have:
ξ(f, f+) ≤ ∆ ⇐⇒ supp(piΦ) ⊆ J−∆,+∆K (27)
For such additive approximation f+, our examples suggested that different distributions piΦ for a virtual
input ϕ can yield different privacy gains for the targeted inputs. We are thus interested in studying the
influence of the distribution piΦ of the virtual input on the behaviour of the leakage measure awaef
+
,piΦ
α,g . To
that end, we first want to evaluate how much privacy is being protected by f+ and piΦ within a distortion
threshold ∆. We can do this through a metric, our objective function for optimisation, that uses the weighted
average of awaef
+
,piΦ
α,g over all the values of xA.
Definition 7. Let α be in R>0 ∪ {∞}. Function objα,g : Ω(DΦ)→ R≥0 is defined, for all piΦ in Ω(DΦ), as:
objα,g(piΦ) =
∑
xA∈DA
p(xA) · awaef
+
,piΦ
α,g (xA) (28)
The targeted parties in T — and perhaps others — now want to find a distribution piΦ that will be optimal
for this given metric, under the constraint that the distortion should remain below the threshold ∆.
Entropies, as mathematical functions, are such that the larger their output is, the less do we actually know.
Therefore, we mean to find a global maximum of the above metric, subject to the distortion-bound constraint.
This ensures that an attacker has, on average, the least information gain for this from all possible virtual
distributions. Using the equivalence in Equation (27), this naturally leads us to the following optimisation
problem.
Definition 8. Let ∆ be in N>0, let α be in R>0 ∪ {∞}. Then we denote by OPα,g(∆) the optimisation
problem:
maximise
piΦ∈Ω(J−∆,+∆K) objα,g(piΦ) (29)
We write ωα,g for the optimal objective value in (29).
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Note that this optimisation problem can equivalently be expressed as optimising the 2∆ + 1 values of
distribution piΦ:
maximise
(piΦ(i))−∆≤i≤+∆
objα,g(piΦ)
subject to
∑
i∈J−∆,+∆KpiΦ(i) = 1
and ∀i ∈ J−∆,+∆K : 0 ≤ piΦ(i) ≤ 1
(30)
8.2 Computing Optimal Virtual Distributions
We now discuss methods for solving this optimisation problem and computing optimal virtual distributions,
where we distinguish between the cases in which α is ∞ or greater or equal to 1.
Optimal Virtual Input Randomisation when 1 ≤ α <∞. For a gain function g : W ×DT → [0, 1], let
us study the objective function of OPα,g(∆). We recall that for all xA in DA and for Vα,g as defined in (11),
we have:
awaef
+
,piΦ
α,g (xA) =
α
1− α · log
(
Vα,g(XT | O′,xA)
)
and where, for all xT in DT, the term p(o′ | xT,xA) is a linear function of piΦ, namely:
p(o′ | xT,xA) =
∑
xS,ϕ
f
+(xA,xT,xS,ϕ)=o
′
p(xS) · p(ϕ)
Below, we may write p(o′, | xT,xA)[piΦ] for p(o′, | xT,xA) in order to make this linear dependency on piΦ
explicit.
We thus have a non-linear and non-convex optimisation problem with linear constraints and where the
objective function is twice continuously differentiable almost everywhere. Sequential Quadratic Programming
(SQP) [38, 39] would thus seem like an adequate and simple solution for finding a local optimum for our
optimisation problem. However, SQP requires the constraints and the objective function to be twice contin-
uously differentiable, which is not the case of our objective function: for all α > 1 and all integer n > 1, the
function y 7→ ‖y‖α is not differentiable at the origin even when restricted to (R≥0)n → R≥0. Consequently,
our objective function is not differentiable at the points piΦ0 in Ω(DΦ) such that piΦ0 makes p(o
′, | xT,xA) be
0 but where p(o′, | xT,xA) is not always 0, i.e., when:(
p(o′, | xT,xA)[piΦ0] = 0
) ∧ (∃piΦ1 ∈ Ω(DΦ) : p(o′, | xT,xA)[piΦ1] > 0)
We will address this by smoothening the objective function in (28) through a non-zero offset vector δ in
(R≥0)|DT| that is added to the argument of the α-norm — the expression in (11) with O′ instead of O.
This approximation is then twice continuously differentiable everywhere. We introduce some definitions for
formalising this:
Definition 9. Let α be in ]1,∞[. Let δ 6= 0 be in (R≥0)|DT|.
1. Let piΦ be in Ω(DΦ). For all xA in DA, we define:
Vδα,g(XT | O′,xA) :=
∑
o
′
∥∥∥∥∥∥δ +
〈∑
xT
p(xT) · p(o′ | xT,xA) · g(w,xT)
〉
w
∥∥∥∥∥∥
α
(31)
awaef
+
,piΦ,δ
α,g (xA) :=
α
1− α · log
(
Vδα,g(XT | O′,xA)
)
(32)
2. We define the function objδα,g : Ω(DΦ)→ R≥0 for all piΦ in Ω(DΦ) as:
objδα,g(piΦ) :=
∑
xA∈DA
p(xA) · awaef
+
,piΦ,δ
α,g (xA) (33)
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For ∆ in N>0, we define OPδα,g(∆) as the following optimisation problem:
maximise
piΦ∈Ω(J−∆,+∆K) obj
δ
α,g(piΦ) (34)
We write ωδα,g for the global maximum of the optimisation problem OPδα,g(∆).
Using the above optimisation problems, we are now able to approximate the result of the original problem
in (29) with an arbitrary accuracy by choosing the value of δ. We formalise this next:
Theorem 3. Let α be in ]1,∞[. Let g be a β-positive gain function (as defined in Definition 1). Let ∆ be
in N>0 and let δ be the vector in (R>0)|DT| whose |DT| components all equal δ in R>0. Then, we have:
∀ε > 0:
(
δ ≤ (1− 1
α
) · ε · β · ln(2)|DO′ | · |W|
)
=⇒
(
|ωα,g − ωδα,g| ≤ ε
)
(35)
where ln(2) refers to the natural logarithm of 2.
Proof. Let piΦ be in Ω(DΦ), let o′ be in DO′ , and let xA be in DA For sake of convenience, let us define the
vector:
W o
′
xA :=
〈∑
xT
p(xT) · p(o′ | xT,xA) · g(w,xT)
〉
w
First, as all the components of the vectors are non-negative, we have:∥∥∥W o′xA + δ∥∥∥α ≥ ∥∥∥W o′xA∥∥∥α
Since α is greater than 1, we know that α1−α is negative, and thus:
awaef
+
,piΦ,δ
α,g (xA) ≤ awaef
+
,piΦ
α,g (xA)
Moreover, application of the triangular inequality yields:∑
o
′
∥∥∥W o′xA + δ∥∥∥α ≤∑
o
′
∥∥∥W o′xA∥∥∥α +∑
o
′
‖δ‖α
Applying logarithm and multiplying by α1−α on both sides, we obtain:
awaef
+
,piΦ,δ
α,g (xA) ≥
α
1− α · log
∑
o
′
∥∥∥W o′xA∥∥∥α +∑
o
′
‖δ‖α

However, for all a and b in R>0, we have log(a+ b) = log(a) + log(1 + ba ). Therefore, we conclude that:
awaef
+
,piΦ,δ
α,g (xA) ≥ awaef
+
,piΦ
α,g (xA) +
α
1− α · log
1 + ∑o′ ‖δ‖α∑
o
′
∥∥∥W o′xA∥∥∥α

Rearranging the terms and summing over xA gives us:
objα,g(piΦ)− objδα,g(piΦ) ≤
∑
xA
p(xA) ·
α
α− 1 · log
1 + ∑o′ ‖δ‖α∑
o
′
∥∥∥W o′xA∥∥∥α

Moreover, for all x in R>0, we know that log(1 + x) ≤ x/ ln(2). Thus, we infer:
objα,g(piΦ)− objδα,g(piΦ) ≤
∑
xA
p(xA) ·
α
α− 1 ·
∑
o
′ ‖δ‖α
ln(2) ·∑o′ ∥∥∥W o′xA∥∥∥α (36)
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Furthermore, for all p in [1,∞] and n in N>0, we get from the topological equivalence of the norms in
finite dimension that for all x in Rn, we have ‖x‖p ≥ ‖x‖1 · n
1
p−1. Therefore:∥∥∥W o′xA∥∥∥α ≥ ∥∥∥W o′xA∥∥∥1 · |W| 1α−1
Now, we know that: ∥∥∥W o′xA∥∥∥1 = ∑
w
∑
xT
p(xT) · p(o′ | xT,xA) · g(w,xT)
=
∑
xT
p(xT) · p(o′ | xT,xA) ·
(∑
w
g(w,xT)
)
Since g is β-positive, we obtain: ∑
o
′
∥∥∥W o′xA∥∥∥α ≥ β · |W| 1α−1
On the other hand, by definition of δ we have:∑
o
′
‖δ‖α = δ · |DO′ | · |W|
1
α
and thus Equation (36) becomes:
objα,g(piΦ)− objδα,g(piΦ) ≤
∑
xA
p(xA) ·
α
α− 1 ·
δ · |DO′ | · |W|
1
α
ln(2) · β · |W| 1α−1
≤ α
α− 1 ·
δ · |DO′ | · |W|
ln 2 · β (37)
Consider now any ε in R>0. In order for obj[α,g](piΦ)− objδα,g(piΦ) not to exceed ε, Equation (37) ensures
that it suffices to have:
δ ≤ (1− 1
α
) · ε · β · ln(2)|DO′ | · |W|
(38)
Finally, the reverse triangle inequality applied on functions objα,g and obj
δ
α,g with the uniform norm
yields:
|ωα,g − ωδα,g| ≤ max
piΦ
| objα,g(piΦ)− objδα,g(piΦ)|
and thus the condition in (38) implies |ωα,g − ωδα,g| < ε.
The last theorem states that, if we are able to solve the optimisation problem OPδα,g(∆) for any non-zero
offset vector δ in R|DT|≥0 , then we are able to approximate the optimal outcome of the original optimisa-
tion problem OPα,g(∆) with arbitrary precision. We now present a method for solving the approximate
optimisation problems OPδα,g(∆).
Method 1. Let us consider the optimisation problem OPδα,g(∆) of (34) where α is in ]1,∞[ The objective
function objδα,g is twice differentiable and the constraints are linear. Thus, we may apply SQP [38, 39] to
find a local optimum for OPδα,g(∆). However, as the objective function objδα,g is non-convex, we will use a
globalisation technique known as the basin-hopping algorithm [40]. In order to respect the linear constraints
of this problem, the starting points of this algorithm will be drawn from a symmetric Dirichlet distribution.
This computational method lets us solve optimisation problems of the form OPδα,g(∆). Consequently,
Theorem 3 enables us to build a method for solving our original optimisation problem OPα,g(∆) with an
arbitrary precision ε, which we formalise in the next method:
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Method 2. We seek a solution of the optimisation problem OPα,g(∆) where α is in [1,∞[ and g is a β-positive
gain function.
Case α > 1. We will solve OPα,g(∆) with a given accuracy ε > 0. In other words, a solution piΦ should
satisfy | objα,g(piΦ)− ωα,g| ≤ ε. First, let us choose δ in R>0 such that:
δ ≤ (1− 1
α
) · ε · β|DO′ | · |W|
Let δ be the vector in R|DT| whose components all equal δ. We apply Method 1 in order to solve the optimisation
problem OPδα,g(∆) . Let piΦ be the solution output by Method 1. By virtue of Theorem 3, we have | objα,g(piΦ)−
ωα,g| ≤ ε.
Case α = 1. Let g be unitary. We can solve OP1,g(∆) using the same procedure as that of Method 1 since
the objective function obj1,g and the constraints of the problem are twice continuously differentiable.
Now that we are able to solve the optimisation problem OPα,g(∆) when α ≥ 1 is finite, we now turn our
attention to the case of α =∞. In the same way as Method 2 builds on Method 1 to approximate a solution,
our next idea will be to approximate the optimal result of OP∞,g(∆) with a multiple of that of OPα,g(∆) for
a sufficiently large α.
First, we introduce OPα,g(∆), a slightly modified version of OPα,g(∆) whose objective function is a
multiple of objα,g. Then, we prove that the solutions of OPα,g(∆) converge towards a solution of OP∞,g(∆).
Moreover, we make the convergence rate explicit for computational purposes. We define OPα,g(∆) next:
Definition 10. Let α be in ]1,∞[.
1. We define the function objα,g : Ω(DΦ)→ R≥0 for all piΦ in Ω(DΦ) as:
objα,g(piΦ) :=
α− 1
α
· objα,g(piΦ) (39)
2. For ∆ in N>0, the optimisation problem OPα,g(∆) is:
maximise
piΦ∈Ω(J−∆,+∆K) objα,g(piΦ) (40)
We write ωα,g denote the optimal objective value for OPα,g(∆).
From this definition it is clear that OPα,g(∆) and OPα,g(∆) are equivalent optimisation problems, in that:
ωα,g =
α− 1
α
· ωα,g (41)
In fact, the optimal values of OPα,g(∆) under-approximate that of OP∞,g(∆), with an error rate domi-
nated by 1α :
Theorem 4. Let the functions τ, θ : ]1,+∞[→ R≥0 be defined as τ(α) = ωα,g and θ(α) = |ω∞,g − ωα,g|.
Then, for all α > 1, we have τ(α) ≤ ω∞,g, limα→∞ τ(α) = ω∞,g, and θ(α) = O( 1α ).
Proof. Let piΦ be in Ω(Z). To simplify notation, we define the vector Y o
′
xA for all xA in DA and o
′ in DO′ as:
Y o
′
xA :=
〈∑
xT
p(xT | o′,xA) · g(w,xT)
〉
w
For all α in ]1,∞] and piΦ in DΦ, we have by definition that objα,g(piΦ) equals:
objα,g(piΦ) = −
∑
xA
p(xA) · log
∑
o
′
p(o′ | xA) ·
∥∥∥Y o′xA∥∥∥α

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We know that in finite dimension, all the norms are topologically equivalent. In particular, for all n in
N>0, x in Rn, and p in ]1,∞[, we have:
‖x‖∞ ≤ ‖x‖p ≤ ‖x‖∞ · n
1
p
Let α be in ]1,∞[. We thus have: ∥∥∥Y o′xA∥∥∥∞ ≤ ∥∥∥Y o′xA∥∥∥α ≤ ∥∥∥Y o′xA∥∥∥∞ · |W| 1α
and thus:
obj∞,g(piΦ)−
1
α
· log(|W|) ≤ objα,g(piΦ) ≤ obj∞,g(piΦ)
From this inequality, we can see that τ(α) ≤ ω∞,g for all α > 1. Moreover:
θ(α) ≤ obj∞,g(piΦ)−
(
obj∞,g(piΦ)−
1
α
· log(|W|)
)
≤ 1
α
· log(|W|)
and thus θ(α) = O( 1α ). In particular, θ converges to 0 as α goes to infinity, which ensures that τ converges
at infinity such that limτ→∞ τ(α) = ω∞,g. Moreover, for any ε in R>0, in order to have θ(α) ≤ ε, it suffices
to have:
α ≥ 1
ε
log(|W|)
From this theorem, we can build a method for solving the optimisation problems of the form OP∞,g(∆).
Indeed, even though the objective function obj∞,g is not twice differentiable, we can approximate the solution
of that optimisation problem with that of OPα,g(∆) for a sufficiently large α. We recall that, by (41), the
optimal value of the latter problem is a multiple of that of OPα,g(∆), which we can solve with Method 2.
However, Method 2 also requires a non-zero accuracy threshold. Thus, for a given ε in R>0, we will invoke
Method 2 in order to solve OPα,g(∆) with accuracy αα−1 · ε2 , and we will take advantage of Theorem 4 to
ensure that the output of our method indeed approximates the optimal objective value with precision ε. We
formalise this idea next:
Method 3. Let ε be in R>0 and let us assume that we wish to solve OP∞,g(∆) with accuracy ε, i.e. that the
solution piΦ we get satisfies | obj∞,g(piΦ)− ω∞,g| ≤ ε. First, we take some α > 1 which satisfies:
α ≥ 2
ε
· log(|W|) (42)
Then, we invoke Method 2 in order to solve OPα,g(∆) with accuracy αα−1 · ε2 . Let piΦ be an optimal solution
for this produced by Method 2. Then, piΦ is an optimal solution of OP∞,g(∆) with accuracy ε.
Proof. As piΦ is the output of Method 2, we know that | objα,g(piΦ)−ωα,g| ≤ αα−1 · ε2 . Multiplying both sides
by α−1α yields:
|objα,g(piΦ)− ωα,g| ≤
ε
2
Moreover, by virtue of Theorem 4 and as we have Equation (42), we know that |ωα,g − ωα,g| ≤ ε2 . Finally,
we know that:
objα,g(piΦ) ≤ obj∞,g(piΦ) ≤ ω∞,g
Appealing to the triangular inequality, we then get:
| obj∞,g(piΦ)− ω∞,g| ≤ |objα,g(piΦ)− ω∞,g|
≤ |objα,g(piΦ)− ωα,g|+ |ωα,g − ω∞,g|
≤ ε
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Figure 6: Approximation of obj∞,id by objp,id for p in {3, 4, 10} while computing f(x, y, z) = 5xy − 2yz with
linear distributions over {1, 2} for piT and piS and piA = {1: 1}.
The next example illustrates how the solution of OP∞,g(∆) is approximated by the successive solutions
of OPα,g(∆) for different values of α. It is worth noting that the calculation of α-norms involves the expo-
nentiation of real numbers ranged in [0, 1] which can quickly be rounded to 0 for large values of α. In order
to mitigate against the effects of such numerical errors, results reports in this paper rely on use of the mpmath
Python library, which enables us to perform arbitrary-precision floating-point arithmetic [41].
Example 4. Let us consider 3 parties X, Y and Z with respective inputs x, y and z, and where A = {X}
is attacking T = {Y } under spectator S = {Z}. Let DA = DT = DS = {1, 2}. Let piT and piS be linear
distributions over their domains and let piA = {1: 1} be a point-mass distribution centred in 1. Function
f : Z3 → Z is defined by f(x, y, z) = 5xy − 2yz.
We study the influence of distributions piΦ for virtual inputs over Ω({0, 1}) on obj∞,id produced by the
output randomisation f+. Such two-dimensional distributions piΦ will be represented by a single real r in
[0, 1], which fully characterises piΦ as {0: r, 1: 1− r}. We evenly discretise the interval [0, 1] into 201 values
for r, and we plot the values of obj∞,id in Figure 6. In order to see the influence of our smoothing method,
we also plot the values of objα,id for different values of α. We can notice that, as suggested by our previous
discussion and by Theorem 4, the approximations objα,id of obj∞,id are functions that are twice differentiable
and that also under-approximate obj∞,id. Moreover, larger values of α produce more accurate approximations
of the original objective function.
Let us now illustrate how the methods we developed here help us to find virtual distributions that protect
the inputs’ privacy optimally, given a some accuracy bound on the distorted output.
Example 5. Let us consider 3 parties X, Y and Z with respective inputs x, y and z, and where A = {X}
is attacking T = {Y } under spectator S = {Z}. Let DA = DT = DS = J1, 30K. Let piT and piS be linear
distributions over their domains and for the sake of the example, let piA = {5: 1} be a point-mass distribution
centred in 5. Let us consider the function f : Z3 → Z defined by f(x, y, z) = x(3y− 5z) + 2z. Let W = {0, 1}
be a set of allowable guesses and let g : W ×DT → [0, 1] be the gain function defined for all w in W and xT
in DT as:
g(w,xT) =
{
1 if w ≡ xT mod 2
0 otherwise
In other words, this gain function g measures the information that an attacker has on the least significant
bit of the secret xT. More generally, we can consider other gain functions that could gauge the information
that an attacker learns on a particular property of a secret. We note that g is β-positive with β = 1.
In comparison to Example 4, a distribution piΦ in Ω(J−1, 1K) will now be characterised by two variables
piΦ(0) and piΦ(1) since then piΦ(−1) = 1 − piΦ(0) − piΦ(1) will be fixed. The first variable piΦ(0) will take its
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Figure 7: Influence of piΦ in Ω(J−1,+1K) in the optimisation problem OP∞,g(1) in the computation of
f(x, y, z) = x(3y − 5z) + 2z with linear distributions over J1, 30K for piT and piS and piA = {5: 1}.
values in [0, 1] while the second one piΦ(1) will take its values in [0, 1−piΦ(0)]. We discretise the interval [0, 1]
into 101 values so that piΦ(0) was assigned these values consecutively. For each of these values of piΦ(0), the
interval [0, 1− piΦ(0)] is furthermore discretised into 101 values that piΦ(1) took consecutively. For each pair
(piΦ(0), piΦ(1)), we compute the value of objg∞(piΦ) for the corresponding piΦ, and we plot the resulting graph
in Figure 7.
Let us now solve the optimisation problem OP∞,g with accuracy ε = 10−2 through Method 3. Here, |W|
equals 2. Let us then take α = 2ε · log(|W|) = 200. We then invoke Method 2 to solve OPα,g(∆) with accuracy
ε′ = αα−1 · ε2 = 5.0 · 10−3. Moreover, a combinatorial calculation gives us |DO′ | = 5656. We thus let:
β = (1− 1
α
) ε
′µ · ln 2
|DO′ | · |W|
= 3.0 · 10−7
and we let δ be the vector in R2>0 whose components all equal β. Finally, we invoke Method 1 to solve
OPδα,g(∆). This produces a nearly optimal solution piΦo = {−1: 0.30, 0: 0.49, 1: 0.21} for which obj∞,g(piΦo)
equals 0.77. This ensures that ω∞,g is in [0.77, 0.78] while a uniform distribution piΦu over {−1, 0, 1} would
have only obj∞,g(piΦu) = 0.56.
9 Discussion and Future Works
In this work, we proposed an approach for quantifying the information that attackers can retrieve about
private inputs from public outputs in black box computations of a public function. We also developed
concepts and methods for mitigating against such information leakage, by distorting the public function with
virtual, private inputs: we introduced some methods for maximising the posterior entropy of the targeted
inputs, and developed non-linear optimisation techniques that can compute virtual inputs that optimally
trade off the privacy protection stemming from virtual inputs and the accuracy of the distorted output in
comparison with the un-distorted output.
Our approach is generic in that, depending on the nature of the inputs and on the use context of the
secure computation, the participants can agree on a particular type of entropy to maximise before entering
the optimisation protocol. Participants may also want their inputs to be protected with respect to different
kinds of entropy, and this could lead us to study multi-objective optimisation and Pareto optimality — a
topic for future work. The quantities and distortions that our approach can compute may also inform the
risk management of using SCM for the same function repeatedly, with potentially different but related inputs
— such as the logging of daily health data.
In a practical secure computation, once an optimal virtual distribution piΦ has been computed by our
methods for a given type of entropy, the participants of the SMC would have to securely produce a virtual
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input drawn from distribution piΦ. For example, the parties may enter an SMC protocol in order to produce
a value ϕ that is secret to all the participants, and that follows distribution piΦ. To that end, parties may
generate locally shares of a virtual input such that the value obtained by the combination of these shares
follows the specified distribution. Alternatively, it may also be practical to let a central authority compute
the virtual inputs — and these virtual inputs could then be fed into SMC protocols in addition to the xi as
seen on the right of Figure 3. For example, if parties are health insurance providers, then the computation
of virtual inputs by a central authority does not require any proof of compliance with health and data
regulations, since the insurance providers would not share sensitive health data with that central authority.
Designing such secure protocols is subject to future works.
Our work considered the prior beliefs on the inputs to be public, constant, and part of the common
knowledge. In SMC, this would enable participants to come to a consensus in order to agree on a common
optimal virtual distribution piΦ and to securely compute the output of f ′. In comparison to the setting
of SMC which assumes that participants have agreed on a actively or passively secure protocol to use, we
assume that participants in our case will agree on an approximate function f ′ and a virtual distribution piΦ
that protects the targets’ privacy. In the case of outsourced computations, those public distributions could
simply be used by a trusted third party in order to produce a virtual input drawn from piΦ and randomise
the computation of f .
On the other hand, it would be of interest to relax these assumptions. In particular, computing an
optimal virtual distribution piΦ requires having a prior belief piA on the attackers’ input. Distribution piΦ
would then maximise the targeted inputs’ privacy given the prior belief piA. But as the computation of piΦ can
be performed offline by any of the parties, this could enable an attacker to substitute his input accordingly.
This could thus update the belief piA and we would require another computation of piΦ. The setting where two
attackers would try to learn information about each other’s input could also lead to interesting game-theoretic
situations to be studied in future work.
We also assumed that the partition of the participants into attackers, targets and spectators was given,
but it would be of interest to develop techniques that can protect the participants’ inputs when the set of
potential attackers is not known. Moreover, we would like to further generalise our approach to the secure
computation of vector-valued functions, i.e. of functions that compute several outputs, and where each of
the outputs can be open to different sets of parties. Finally, scaling our approach to large input spaces is
also one of our future research objectives.
10 Conclusion
Although efficient SMC protocols have been designed, information flow of outputs is inevitable, and has
recently been rigorously formalised and quantified [15]. In this work, we first proposed a generalised notion
of entropy that makes our approach compatible with different widely used measures of information flow. We
then introduced the concepts of function substitution and virtual input that aim at randomising the output
of SMC computations in order to impede the influence of deceitful attackers wishing to use input substitution
to gain maximal information about private inputs from opened outputs. We have established some theoret-
ical bounds for the privacy gain that approximations and close approximations provide. We then focused
on additive approximations and formalised an optimisation problem that aims at maximising participants’
privacy while controlling the distortion introduced on the output. We proposed different methods for solving
such optimisation problems in practice and we experimentally showed that additive approximations give rise
to significant privacy gains under specified distortion bounds.
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